Description
The U.S. Army supply organization for the Normandy Invasion, although very impressive, should have done a better job in the summer of 1944. The supply system suffered from several serious shortcomings which should have been avoided. The purpose of this work is to examine an aspect of military history which, as many military historians have pointed out, has received little attention. As the Gulf War demonstrated, logistics, the supplying of armies, is crucial to achieving victory.
About the Author
STEVE R. WADDELL is Associate Professor of History at the United States Military Academy. He has published in the journal Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual and in a number of co-authored works relating to Soviet technology and its military applications for the Center for Strategic Technology, Texas A&M University. He has also contributed to the Reference Guide to the U.S. Military.
About the Author
STEVE R. WADDELL is Associate Professor of History at the United States Military Academy. He has published in the journal Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual and in a number of co-authored works relating to Soviet technology and its military applications for the Center for Strategic Technology, Texas A&M University. He has also contributed to the Reference Guide to the U.S. Military.
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